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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JESUS ARGUMEDO-ROORIGUEZ 
Defendanty'Appellant. 
Case No. 20080706-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
TURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a conviction for disarming a police officer, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dino Himonas 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Is Defendant's brief inadequate for failure to develop and apply 
relevant legal authority and failure to marshal the evidence? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies. 
Issue 2: Was the evidence sufficient to convict Defendant of disarming a 
police officer? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that the testimony of 
Defendant's expert was inadmissible? 
Standard of Review: The trial court has "considerable discretion" in 
determining whether expert testimony is admissible and whether a proposed expert 
is qualified to give an opinion on specific matters. Craig Food Indus, v. Wehing, 746 
P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced verbatim: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004). 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally takes or 
removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm from the person or 
immediate presence of a person he knows is a peace officer: 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a 
2 
peace officer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (West 2004J. 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal 
charge unless such intoxication negates the existence of the mental 
state which is an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or 
criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his 
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information dated July 18, 2006, Defendant Jesus Argumedo Rodriguez 
("Defendant") was charged with disarming a police officer, driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, operating a vehicle by an alcohol-restricted person and failure 
to yield the right of way. R. 1. 
Following a two-day bench trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts. R. 
211:169-77. 
On July 11,2008, Defendant received a suspended five-years-to-life sentence 
and was ordered to spend 180 days in the Salt Lake County jail. R. 195-97. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 204. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 17, 2006, Defendant was drunk. R. 211:169-70. 
In fact, he was very drunk. According to West Valley City Police Officer 
Garrett Freir, Defendant flunked all field sobriety tests administered after he was 
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stopped for erratic driving around 3:50 a.m. R. 210:21-33. Defendant had difficulty 
maintaining his balance and nearly fell, first as he exited his vehicle and then later 
during portions of the tests requiring him to walk or stand on one leg. R. 210:20,28, 
32. 
A later Breathalyzer test confirmed what was obvious to the officers: 
Defendant was very drunk. His blood-alcohol concentration registered at 0.177— 
more than double the legal limit for driving a car. See, e.g., R. 210:88. 
These facts are undisputed. At the conclusion of his bench trial, Defendant 
conceded he was guilty of DUI, operating a vehicle by an alcohol restricted driver 
and failure to yield the right of way. R. 211:158-59. 
The only remaining question was whether Defendant was also guilty of 
attempting to disarm a police officer when he grabbed at Officer Freir's bolstered 
sidearm as officers attempted to arrest him. 
Defendant argues he simply fell. See, e.g., R. 211:166. Alternatively, be argues 
that he was so intoxicated that he could not form the specific intent to disarm the 
officer. Id. 
However, the only witnesses who observed Defendant's movements 
firsthand — the arresting officers — described them as conscious and deliberate. R. 
210:38; 211:103. Both officers testified that they believed they were in imminent 
danger. 
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"[Bjased on the [Defendant's] movements prior to and leading up to this 
event, this was a very sudden movement, this was very specific, and it caused my 
heart to drop, and I believe that he was making a movement towards my handgun, 
as did my assisting officer. We both reacted/7 R. 210:83. 
Officer Carl Wimmer confirmed Officer Freir's account:"Officer Freir told the 
gentleman to turn around and put his hands behind his back. At that point the 
subject, the Defendant, turned slightly to his left, and looked over his left shoulder 
somewhat. That made me nervous. So I moved very close to the subject. I didn't 
know if he was planning on running away or what the case may be. But it just 
made me nervous. So I moved closer to the subject. At that point the Defendant 
turned around quickly, moved in very quickly and close to Officer Freir, and 
reached out and, from my perspective, grabbed Officer Freir's handgun/7 R. 
211:102-03. 
Officer Wimmer concluded: "I was extremely afraid for our safety/7 Id. 
Officer Freir stated that he grabbed Defendant's arm and felt it stiffen as the 
officer attempted to dislodge Defendant's hand from his gun. R. 210:38. To subdue 
Defendant, Officer Wimmer kneed him in the chest and punched him. R. 211:102-
03. Officer Wimmer then held Defendant in a headlock while Officer Freir 
handcuffed him. R. 211; 105. The officers sat Defendant on the curb and summoned 
paramedics. Id. 
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"Why did you do that?" Defendant asked. Id. 
" [Because y]ou grabbed Officer Freir's gun. You grabbed his gun/' Officer 
Wimmer replied. Id. 
"I know/' Defendant responded, "but I was almost home, and you stopped 
me." Id. 
Defendant did not testify at trial and the officers' testimony is unrebutted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed. Defendant cites 
generic propositions from a few cases, but never properly develops or applies the 
caselaw to his legal arguments. For this reason alone, this Cour should reject 
Defendant's claims. 
Point II: The evidence the Defendant attempted to seize Officer Freir's 
handgun is not only adequate; it is overwhelming and unrebutted. Both Officers 
Freil and Wimmer testified that Defendant did not simply stumble when he 
lurched toward Officer Freil and placed his hand on the officer's handgun. And 
when confronted, Defendant admitted that he grabbed the officer's gun. 
Defendant offered no contrary evidence. 
Point III: The trial court correctly excluded Defendant's proposed expert 
testimony on intoxication. The expert, psychologist James L. Poulton, did not 
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establish a proper foundation for his opinion that Defendant was so intoxicated 
that he could not form the mental state for the crime. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED. 
A. Lack of "meaningful legal analysis." 
Defendant's brief lacks "meaningful legal analysis" because it presents 
"bald citations to authority" with no development of or "reasoned analysis based 
upon that authority." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, f 29,135 P.3d 
874; State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 32, 973 P.2d 404. Accordingly, Defendant's 
claims fail for inadequate briefing. 
This Court "is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump 
the burden of argument and research." Goodman, 2006 UT 27, f^ 29 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). An adequately briefed argument must 
provide "meaningful legal analysis." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). A brief must go beyond providing conclusory statements and "fully 
identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments." Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Adequate briefing requires "not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based upon 
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that authority .. /'Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
Defendant's brief cites exactly 11 cases, none of which are developed or 
meaningfully applied to the facts of this case. Indeed, virtually all of the cases 
cited in Defendant's brief merely state general legal principles. See, e.g., App. Br. 
at 26-27, 29. Most of Defendant's brief consists of long excerpts from the trial 
transcript loosely knit together by unsupported argument and narrative. E.g. 
App. Br. at 20-26; 30-39. Because Defendant has "dump[ed] the burden of 
argument and research" on the Court, his claims should be rejected outright. 
B. Failure to marshal. 
Part I of Defendant's brief is also inadequate because he raises a sufficiency 
claim without marshalling the evidence. See App. Br. at 21-28. "A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Presenting evidence supporting 
the challenged conclusion does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Parties 
cannot discharge their duty by simply providing] an exhaustive review of all 
evidence presented at trial." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, % 26,140 P.3d 1200 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Rather, parties must "temporarily remove [their] own 
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prejudices arid fully embrace the adversary's position; [they] must play the 
'devil's advocate.'" Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
"[A]ppellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their" own 
positions. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, they 
"must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then 
explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Rather than properly marshaling the evidence, Defendant simply ignores 
the evidence that supports the trial court's findings and presents his own version 
of the evidence, mostly in conclusory form. Defendant highlights portions of the 
transcript supporting his extreme inebriation and difficulty maintaining his 
balance. See, e.g., App. Br. at 20-26. He makes virtually no mention of the 
officers' unequivocal testimony that Defendant's movements in attempting to grab 
Officer Freir's weapon were directed, focused and intentional. 
Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence renders his sufficiency argument 
inadequate. See Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1110 (Utah App. 1995). This Court 
may affirm on that basis alone. See id. (declining to address appellant's arguments 
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and affirming where appellant's brief inadequate for failing to marshal the 
evidence). 
II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF DISARMING A POLICE OFFICER. 
Even if this Court excuses Defendant's inadequate briefing, the evidence was 
sufficient to convict him of disarming a police officer. Indeed, the only evidence 
introduced at trial showed that Defendant, despite his apparent intoxication, 
intentionally tried to grab Officer Freir's handgun. 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
"sustain[s] the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence," or the Court "otherwise reachfes] a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). Furthermore, "it is the province of the trier of 
factfin this case the trial court] to determine which testimony and facts to believe 
and what inferences to draw from those facts." State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, f 
15, 15 P.3d 635. This Court therefore "determine[s] only whether sufficient 
competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each element of the charge." State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, If 44, 57 P.3d 977. 
Voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense unless the intoxication "negates 
the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense;..." Utah Code 
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Ann. § 76-2-306 (West 2004); State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998) (voluntary 
intoxication valid defense only when defendant's intoxication renders him incapable 
of forming intent necessary for commission of crime). Voluntary intoxication does 
not absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless criminal acts, State v. 
Royhall, 710 P.2d 168,170 (Utah 1985), because such a defendant is responsible for 
having voluntarily and knowingly become intoxicated. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 
(Utah 1985). 
However, voluntary intoxication may provide a defense to crimes if the 
defendant is so intoxicated that he could not form the knowing or voluntary mental 
state required for certain offenses. For example, a defendant may raise a voluntary 
intoxication defense to crimes like aggravated murder where intoxication negates 
the mental state requiring deliberation and premeditation. See, e.g., State v. Stenbeck, 
2 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1931) ("It may be that due to intoxication or other causes the mind 
is so deadened or so bereft of reason that it can neither deliberate nor premeditate 
and yet the will power may be sufficiently active to form an intent to do an act 
which results in the death of a human being/'); but see Claiborne v. State, 555 S.W.2d 
414, 418 (Term. Crim. 1977) (although voluntary intoxication generally negates 
premeditation or deliberation necessary for conviction of first-degree murder, 
premeditation and deliberation are presumed when victim is police officer). 
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Evidence of a defendant's volitional conduct reasonably supports a 
determination that he acted intentionally, despite intoxication. See, e.g., Roche v. 
State, 690 N.E.2d 1115,1125 (Ind. 1998) ("[intoxication is not available as a defense 
where the acts committed require a significant degree of physical or intellectual skill 
such as devising a plan, operating equipment, instructing others, or carrying out 
acts requiring physical skill"); State v. Humphrey, 845 P.2d 592, 605 (Kan. 1992) (if 
defendant's intoxication "did not affect his ability to reason, to plan, to recall, or to 
exercise his motor skills, he has not met the standard for the voluntary intoxication 
defense/7). 
In People v. Jones, 384 N.E.2d 523 (111. App. 1978), the defendant was convicted 
of battery and resisting a peace officer after he punched and kicked an officer who 
was wearing a uniform and also resisted two other officers at the police station and 
in the cell block. Id. at 524-25. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was so 
intoxicated that he was unable to cooperate with the police and could not control the 
"involuntarily induced" movements of his arms and legs. Id. at 525. The appeals 
court affirmed, holding that although defendant was intoxicated, jurors could have 
reasonably concluded that the movements were calculated kicks and punches 
directed at the officers. Id. 
[T]o be a defense to criminal charges, a condition of intoxication must 
be so extreme as to suspend all reason.. . .There are many degrees of 
intoxication through which an individual may pass before reaching the 
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level of intoxication at which power of reason is entirely suspended so 
as to render him incapable of any mental action, such as forming the 
specific intent to commit a crime Although defendant characterizes 
his conduct as an "inability" to cooperate with the police, the evidence 
indicates defendant's conduct could as well be characterized as an 
unwillingness to cooperate. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer because he was too drunk to 
form the mens rea to commit the crime. A person commits the offense of disarming a 
police officer if he, as a party to the offense, 
intentionally takes or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm 
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows is a peace 
officer: 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004). 
Defendant argues that he merely lost his balance and accidentally fell toward 
Officer Freir — a movement the officers mistook for an attempt to grab the officer's 
sidearm. See, e.g., App. Br. at 19. But there is no evidence to support this argument. 
Officers Freir and Wimmer both testified that Defendant abruptly lunged forward, 
placed his hand on Officer Freir7s bolstered handgun and attempted to pull the 
weapon away from the officer. R. 210:83; 211:102-03. 
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Defendant offered no contrary evidence. Instead, Defendant offers contrary 
interpretations of the evidence developed at trial. For example, Defendant points out 
in his brief that his extreme inebriation caused him to lose his balance twice during 
the field sobriety tests. App. Br. at 20-21. Because he was unsteady on his feet, 
Defendant argues, it is possible that he lost his balance and fell toward Officer Freir. 
See, e.g., App. Br. at 27. 
This possibility was refuted by Defendant's own admission that he was 
attempting to grab Officer Freir's gun: 
" Why did you do that?" Defendant asked after the two officers subdued him. 
R.211:105. 
"[Because y]ou grabbed Officer Freir's gun. You grabbed his gun/7 Officer 
Wimmer replied. Id. 
"I know," Defendant responded, "but I was almost home, and you stopped 
me." Id. 
Although Officers Freir and Wimmer both acknowledged that Defendant was 
very intoxicated and at times had difficulty maintaining his balance, they flatly 
denied that defendant tripped, stumbled or lost his balance when he moved toward 
Officer Freir. See, e.g., R. 210:83; 211:102-03. Because Defendant chose not to testify, 
the only evidence concerning his actions comes from the arresting officers, both of 
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whom testified unequivocally that Defendant's movements were not inadvertent or 
accidental. 
At a more fundamental level, Defendant's argument suffers from a glaring 
inconsistency. On the one hand, Defendant relies on the officers' testimony—and 
their credibility—to attempt to establish that he was so intoxicated that he lost his 
balance and nearly fell on at least two occasions during the sobriety tests. See, e.g. 
App. Br. at 20-25. By contrast, when the officers testifies that Defendant attempted 
to grab Officer Freir's handgun, their testimony is dismissed unreliable. See, id., at 
13, 26. This argument makes no sense. If the officers were able to accurately 
observe and report Defendant's voluntary attempts to follow instructions given as 
part of the field sobriety tests, as well as his involuntary loss of balance, there is no 
reason to discount their later determination that Defendant was acting voluntarily 
when he attempted to disarm Officer Freir. 
In sum, the evidence supporting Defendant's conviction for attempting to 
disarm a peace officer was not merely sufficient; it was undisputed. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
RULING THAT THE DR. POULTON'S TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S MENTAL STATE WAS 
INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT LACKED AN ADEQUATE 
FOUNDATION. 
The trial court was well within its discretion when it ruled that Defendant's 
expert had not provided proper foundation for his opinion that Defendant was too 
intoxicated to form the intent to disarm a police officer. 
The trial court has "considerable discretion" in determining whether expert 
testimony is admissible and whether a proposed expert is qualified to give an 
opinion on specific matters. Craig Food Indus, v. Wehing, 746 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 
1987). To determine the admissibility of expert testimony, a trial court looks to rule 
702, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
. . . [I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702(a).1 Before expert testimony based on scientific evidence may be 
admitted, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy a three-prong test developed 
1
 On November 1,2007, rule 702 was amended, adding subsections (b) and (c). 
The amendment itself appears to do no more than codify the threshold requirement 
of inherent reliability under step one of Rimmasch, as well as codify the alternative 
ways by which the requirement may be satisfied, i.e., through an evidentiary 
hearing or by judicial notice. See Utah R. Evid. 702. However, the advisory 
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in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). The proponent of the testimony must 
demonstrate that: (1) "the scientific principles and techniques underlying the 
expert's testimony are inherently reliable/' (2) "the scientific principles or 
techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by 
sufficiently qualified experts," and (3) the evidence is otherwise admissible under 
"rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 
1996). The burden of persuasion rests on the proponent of the evidence. See 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396,407. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that this standard for admitting 
expert testimony "is necessary because science in the court is a two-edged sword. 
While often helpful, scientific testimony also has the potential to overawe and 
confuse, and even to be misused for that purpose." Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 
115, ^ 56,61 P.3d 1068. Further, the supreme court's "jurisprudential history reveals 
committee note mirrors the federal note regarding expert testimony on general 
principles: 
It might be important in some cases for an expert to educate the 
factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply these 
principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an 
expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of principles 
relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. 
Utah R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note. 
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a consistent attempt to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence while 
allowing a maximum of relevant information to flow to the finder of fact/' Id. 
Because voluntary intoxication provides a defense only when the level of 
intoxication negates the mental state for the crime, see section II, above, Dr. 
Poulton's testimony was potentially relevant to only a single issue: Did defendant 
have the ability to form the intent to disarm Officer Freil? 
In an effort to provide sufficient foundation for his opinion, Dr, Poulton 
stated he is a consultant for Odyssey House, a treatment center for all kinds of 
addictions, R. 211:142, and that he, like other psychologists, "continually get training 
on physiological effects of things like alcohol and other substances." R. 211:156. He 
acknowledged, however, that treating alcoholics "is not a huge part of my practice, 
no." R. 211:142. 
He testified that he based his opinion on interviews with Defendant, his wife, 
his business associate and a friend. R, 211:144-45. He also administered a 
personality test and reviewed the police reports concerning the arrest, R. 211:151, 
and reviewed the police reports prepared by Officers Freil and Wimnier. Dr. 
Poulton noted that, according to police reports, Defendant fell when he exited his 
vehicle, which indicated that he "was so intoxicated that he was unable actually to 
get his body to follow through with any intent . . . I think that, given that he was 
unable to make his body move in a gross motor movement like that, he was also just 
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a couple of minutes later unable to make his body move with the intent of wresting 
the gun away from the officer. " R. 211:154-55. 
Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Dr. Poulton's testimony was 
inadmissible. R. 211:157-58. Under Rimmasch, this ruling is clearly correct. 
Defendant fails under the first Rimmasch prong because he did not show that "the 
scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are inherently 
reliable." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the "principles 
and techniques" Dr. Poulton discussed in his testimony are properly deemed 
"scientific." The only aspect of Dr. Poulton's testimony premised on even remotely 
scientific principles or techniques concerned his use of the MMPI (Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory), a widely used diagnostic test. But Dr. Poulton 
never discloses the results of Defendant's MMPI or explains how the test is relevant 
to the question of whether Defendant's voluntary intoxication negated his ability to 
form the requisite mental state to try to disarm Officer Freir. 
Under step two of the Rimmasch test, the proponent of the expert testimony 
must establish "an adequate foundation for the proposed testimony." Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d at 398 n.7; Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. This step requires showing that "the 
scientific principles or techniques have been properly applied to the facts of the 
particular case by qualified persons and that the testimony is founded on that 
work." Id. 
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Again, given that Dr. Poulton provided virtually no testimony concerning the 
"science" he employed to reach his conclusions, it is impossible to know whether 
the scientific principles or techniques, if any, were properly applied. And because 
the science underlying Dr. Poulton's opinion was never articulated, it is equally 
impossible to know whether he had the necessary qualifications to properly apply 
the scientific principles or techniques. Certainly, Dr. Poulton was qualified to testify 
on accepted treatments for alcoholism, as well as Defendant's history, psychological 
profile, possible psychiatric diagnoses and his propensity for violence. R. 211:142, 
147,148-53. But such testimony was not relevant to the narrow issue of Defendant's 
mental state on the night of his arrest. As the trial court found, Dr. Poulton "has not 
been qualified to render the opinion you have asked for . . . " R. 211:158. 
Finally, Dr. Poulton failed address or attempt to explain what was arguably 
the most critical item of evidence against Defendant—his verbal acknowledgment 
that he was attempting to grab Officer Freil's weapon. R. 211:105. 
In sum, Dr. Poulton failed to provide sufficient foundation to support opinion 
testimony on the one narrow issue relevant to Defendant's guilt or innocence — 
whether he could form the requisite intent to disarm or attempt to disarm a police 
officer at the time of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
the testimony inadmissible. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17* day of June, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETTJ.DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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